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SUMMARY
1. CAPTAIN ORRIK’S RELEVANT
EXPERIENCE IN U.S. NAVY AND IN U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION.
2. OPERATIONAL SAFEGUARDS
RESPONSE EVALUATIONS (OSREs) ARE PERFORMANCE BASED TACTICAL FORCE-ON-FORCE
EXERCISES CONDUCTED BY NRC ON SITE AT NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS TO ASSESS THEIR ARMED
RESPONSE (OR COUNTER TERRORIST) CAPABILITY. FROM 1991 TO 2001, NRC HAS
IDENTIFIED WEAKNESSES AT 46% OF THE PLANTS.
3. CURRENTLY, ALL 65 NUCLEAR
POWER PLANT SITES ARE AT A HEIGHTENED STATE OF READINESS.
4. NRC ORDERED SPECIFIC SECURITY
UPGRADES ON FEBRUARY 25.
5. NRC ESTABLISHED OFFICE OF
NUCLEAR SECURITY AND INCIDENT RESPONSE ON APRIL 7.
6. NEW, OR INTERIM, DESIGN BASIS
THREAT NEEDED TO PROVIDE A COMMON YARDSTICK FOR INDUSTRY TO MAKE APPROPRIATE
UPGRADES AND NRC TO ASSESS UPGRADED SECURITY
7. RESUMPTION OF NRC INDEPENDENT
ASSESSMENTS (i.e.,. OSREs) NEEDED. INDUSTRY SELF-ASSESSMENT NOT APPROPRIATE POST
SEPTEMBER 11.
TESTIMONY
Mr. Chairman and Members of the
Subcommittee, I am pleased to appear before you to discuss security at
commercial power plants licensed by the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. I
will note my qualifications in these matters, recent relevant history of
security at these nuclear power plants, and recent and still-needed actions by
NRC.
I am a retired U.S. Navy Captain.
I am qualified for, and have served in both Naval Surface Warfare and Naval
Special Warfare. I had combat duty in Vietnam in 1964 and 1965 as a Naval
Advisor to the South Vietnamese "Junk" and Riverine Forces. I have
commanded a U.S. Navy Destroyer and, in1977 through 1981,as the Director of the
Nuclear Weapons Division for the Naval Sea Systems Command, I was responsible
for the Safety, Engineering and Security of tactical nuclear weapons and for the
security of conventional Arms, Ammunition, and Explosives. I have been with NRC
for 17 years, and have been team leader or program manager for the operational
safeguards response evaluation (OSRE) program since its inception in 1991.
The OSRE is a performance based
evaluation of the armed response capability at nuclear power plants. It uses
table top time line drills and force-on-force exercises on site to test a plant’s
protection strategy and its execution by its armed response force. It is
essentially the only test of a plant’s anti-terrorist capability. However,
plants were scheduled for an OSRE only once every eight years. Each OSRE was
also scheduled from 6 to 10 months in advance, and each OSRE followed the same
agenda and used the same NRC design basis threat, or less for the test. The
utilities provided the adversary teams. NRC chose the targets for the exercises
and advised the adversary team as to tactics. Eighty-one OSREs have been
conducted to date. At 37 of them, the expert NRC team identified a significant
weakness; significant being defined as the adversary team simulating sabotaging
a target set, which would lead to core damage and in many cases, to a probable
radioactive release. It is important to note that, even with adequate time for
the plants to prepare and make themselves ready for the OSRE, that 46%still had
a weakness in armed response. The happy side of this coin is at least twofold.
First, as NRC identified weaknesses, the utilities corrected them. Second, I
once asked a plant security director if he thought the OSRE was a learning
experience. He replied, no, but that preparing for an OSRE was a big learning
experience. That is reflected in a major improvement in the industry’s armed
response or counter-terrorism capability since 1991.
Currently, all 65 nuclear power
plant sites are at a heightened state of readiness with regards to a terrorist
attack as a result of NRC advisories. And, they are now doing further upgrades
as specified by the NRC in the orders of February 25, 2002. Many of the upgrades
are a direct result of special security assessments that the OSRE expert team
was tasked to conduct at six plants’ in December, 2001. Another significant
action by the NRC was the establishment of the Office of Nuclear Security and
Incident Response on April 7, 2002. This was strong agency recognition of the
increased importance and visibility of counter-terrorist security at America’s
nuclear power plants.
In a parallel action, your
Committee and the House of Representatives has approved legislation addressing
the increased national concern about security at America’s nuclear power
plants. My understanding is that this legislation, among other things, would
require NRC to adopt a new design basis threat that addresses the heightened
security concerns raised in the aftermath of September 11. This highlights the
need for quick NRC action to establish a new and more formidable design basis
threat, interim or final.
The lack of anew/interim design
basis threat is having a negative impact. Plant security directors all have the
same plea; what is the new, or interim, design basis threat? They want to buy
equipment, such as bullet resistant enclosures, but don’t know what level of
protection is going to be needed. They want to be ready to train their
personnel, but against what threat? NRC cannot begin effective performance
testing with the OSRE team without knowing what the yardstick is, so, until the
design basis threat is established, we cannot effectively test the new upgraded
security levels that NRC has ordered. Further, the new design basis threat is
needed to establish just what level of capability the nation, and NRC, will
require of the licensees, and what other capabilities will have to come from
other sources, e.g, the federal government. Further, the capability "‘mix"
could be site-specific.
Resuming performance based
testing of nuclear power plants’ armed response capability is critical to
assuring that nuclear power plants are adequately protected against the new
levels of terrorist threat contemplated after September 11. Before September 11,
NRC had agreed to a pilot program, called Safeguards Performance Assessments -
or SPA - wherein the industry would self-evaluate their armed response
capability. Self evaluation, post September 11, is a step in the wrong
direction. Further, the industry’s track record pre-September 11 does not
support such an action. In the OSREs conducted to date, it can be assumed that
each of the 81 plants had prepared and felt that they were ready to meet the
challenge of OSRE force-on-force exercises. Thirty-seven, or 46% were not. That
46% holds true even for or the last two years of OSREs. The SPA pilot program
should be canceled. Independent performance evaluations are needed to evaluate
plants’ strategy and ability to execute that strategy, to identify weaknesses
and strengths, and to assure not only correction of weaknesses, but to assure
that nuclear power plants reach and maintain the performance level that the
nation, via NRC, demands of them.
The only major problem with the
previous OSRE program was its frequency, once every 8 years. The SPA was
proposing an evaluation every 3 years. NRC has the assets, knowledge, and
experience to conduct OSREs every 3 years. It could be a important task for and
contribution from the new Office of Nuclear Security and Incident Response.
Resuming OSREs would be fulfilling NRC’s fundamental responsibil1ity of
protecting public health and safety. Allowing industry self-assessment would be
an abrogation of NRC/governmental responsibility.
The SPA had another good element,
that of requiring periodic training and exercising of the plants’ armed
response capability at various levels of complexity. That idea too should be
incorporated into NRC rule-making for renewed, and more vigorous, performance
assessment of nuclear power plants.
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