Chairman Tauzin

Prepared Witness Testimony

The House Committee on Energy and Commerce

W.J. "Billy" Tauzin, Chairman

Link to Committee Tip Line:  Fight Waste, Fraud and Abuse
   

 

 

H.R. 3406, The Electric Supply and Transmission Act of 2001

Subcommittee on Energy and Air Quality
December 13, 2001
09:30 AM
2123 Rayburn House Office Building 

 

 
 

Mr. Alan Richardson
American Public Power Association

Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, my name is Alan Richardson and I am the President and Chief Executive Officer of the American Public Power Association (APPA).  Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss APPA’s views on H.R. 3406, the Electricity Supply and Transmission Act.  APPA represents the interests of more than 2000 publicly owned electric utility systems across the country, serving approximately 40 million citizens.  APPA member utilities include state public power agencies and municipal electric utilities that serve some of the nation’s largest cities.  However, the vast majority of these publicly owned electric utilities serve small and medium-sized communities in 49 states, all but Hawaii.  In fact, 75 percent of our members are located in cities with populations of 10,000 people or less.  Further, most publicly owned utilities are not generation self-sufficient but depend on wholesale power purchases to meet the retail loads of the communities they serve.  Competitive wholesale markets are in our interest and we have a very long record in support of legislative and regulatory initiatives that promote greater real competition in these markets.  Finally, almost without exception, publicly owned utilities depend on others for transmission.  Fair terms for transmission access at just, reasonable and non-discriminatory rates have always been critically important for public power 

Public power systems’ first and only purpose is to provide reliable, efficient- service to their local customers at the lowest possible cost.  Publicly owned utilities also have an obligation to serve the electricity needs of their customers and they have maintained that obligation, even in states that have introduced retail competition.  And, because they are governed democratically through their state and local government structures, public power systems operate in the sunshine, subject to open meeting laws, public record laws and conflict of interest rules.   

For decades, APPA has supported legislative efforts to make the wholesale electric market more competitive.  APPA was one of the major supporters of the transmission access provisions of the Energy Policy Act of 1992.  On numerous occasions over the past few years, we have testified in support of the enactment of federal legislation that promotes competition, increases reliability, expands the transmission system, addresses market power in generation and transmission, and eliminates tax-related impediments to competition for municipal utilities.  

These past few years, and especially the past two years, have been a period of rapid and dramatic change in our industry.  This change has occurred in federal and state policies on electricity competition and regulation; in the wholesale and retail markets for electricity; and in the minds and attitudes of consumers.  The lessons learned from these experiences should serve to guide this subcommittee and other policy makers on any additional changes to the industry that may be necessary.  

The goal of Federal restructuring legislation should be to promote competition in the wholesale electric market for the benefit of consumers.  There are several fundamental elements necessary for real competition to exist and be sustained over time.  These include:  ease of entry to and exit from the market; availability and transparency of market data; a sufficient number of buyers and sellers; and effective controls to prevent the abuse of market power where possible and remedy abuses when discovered.  

H.R. 3406 is, presumably, a bill “to benefit consumers and enhance the Nation’s energy security by removing barriers to the development of competitive markets for electric power….” H.R. 3406 falls far short of these lofty goals because it fails to encourage the creation of an environment that is consistent with the fundamental elements that are prerequisites for competition.  Indeed, H.R. 3406 represents a significant step in the opposite direction.  In its present form, this bill will neither benefit consumers nor remove barriers to competition.  It does just the opposite. 

Briefly stated, we oppose H.R. 3406 in its present form because:

  1. It eliminates FERC merger review authority.  This review is not redundant with existing authority under the antitrust laws exercised by the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission.  Unrestrained and unexamined mergers can clearly be a barrier to the development of competitive markets.  Every merger eliminates at least one competitor from the market and many mergers are pursued precisely for this reason.  FERC’s authority to review proposed mergers should be expanded to include mergers of holding companies, transfers of generation facilities, and consolidation of electric and natural gas companies.  FERC should also retain present authority to be used as necessary to promote competition, including the authority to condition mergers and grant permission to sell power at market based rates on membership in FERC approved regional transmission organizations.

  2. It repeals the Public Utility Holding Company Act, an important consumer protection statute, without enhancing FERC’s authority to deal with market power problems.  All agree that PUHCA repeal will result in new mergers and further consolidation within the electric utility industry.  … Prescriptive that they severely limit FERC’s discretion with respect to such critical issues as appropriate size, scope and function.  Further, H.R. 3406 would prohibit FERC from conditioning approval of such things as sales of power at market based rates on RTO membership.

  3. It imposes almost insurmountable financial obstacles on communities that want to create their own locally owned and publicly controlled electric utility by dictating the formula that must be used to calculate “stranded costs” incurred by the incumbent utility.  In calculating stranded costs, FERC must use as a benchmark factors that existed in 1996, factors that are not likely to bear any relationship to conditions that exist today or in the future, not the least of which is the underlying historically installed generation capacity situation.  The intent of this section is clear – to prevent the creation of new public power systems whether or not they advance competition, or promote lower rates and better service for America’s electric consumers. 

  4. It promotes incentive rates for transmission service that are unnecessary, inconsistent with the Commission’s responsibilities to ensure only just and reasonable rates for transmission, and will certainly lead to higher costs for consumers.

  5. It subjects wholesale power sales and rates charged for transmission access by publicly owned utilities to private power companies to after-the-fact regulatory proceedings by FERC for no legitimate public purpose.  

Due to a number of recent developments, we recommend that the subcommittee defer action on comprehensive restructuring legislation at this time.    The number of issues that now require congressional action has greatly decreased.  This is due in large part to the willingness of the current members of FERC to exercise authorities already available to them under the Federal Power Act.  We believe the current members of FERC have a very clear vision as to what is necessary to promote real competition and they recognize that competition is a means to promote the interests of consumers and not an end in itself.  FERC has set out, and begun to act on, an impressive set of initiatives to establish effective wholesale competition.  And while public power systems have concerns about aspects of some of those initiatives, on the whole, we applaud the FERC for taking action to deal with serious problems in the wholesale markets. 

Much of what APPA and others have advocated in federal legislation debates prior to these actions by the FERC was mainly necessary in order to direct an unwilling FERC to use its existing authority appropriately.  APPA has consistently supported pro-competitive legislative proposals that would both direct the Commission to act, and provide it with the political support to do so.  Thus, in light of FERC’s new direction, it seems prudent to allow FERC to develop and implement these stated initiatives without overly prescriptive statutory changes imposed by Congress.  

Any legislation that may ultimately be approved by Congress must first do no harm to consumers and should, as mentioned above, build on the valuable lessons learned in the recent past.   For example, we learned from the Western electricity crisis that premature decisions to allow market-based rates, based on outdated and inadequate analytical tools and faulty assumptions, will have significant negative consequences for consumers.     FERC is undertaking such a review at the present time.  An important tool at its disposal is to condition market based rate approval on participation in an approved RTO.  Provisions of H.R. 3406 would eliminate this authority.  If Congress is serious about promoting competition, it should applaud FERC’s recent initiatives, not advance proposals that undermine them. The collapse of Enron teaches us that market transparency and full access to all books, records, and other pertinent information by regulators is essential, although there may be many other lessons yet to be learned as the Enron story unfolds.   

We also learned that local control of public power systems continues to work extremely well.  Publicly owned utilities in California and throughout the nation have retained their obligation to serve all their customers and continue to meet that obligation with quality, reliable service at cost-based rates.   About the only thing California did right was preserve local control of public power.  Public power systems have retained their generation assets and are actively planning and building to bring additional resources on line, including significant investments in renewable and distributed generation projects.   Public power is also working to add additional transmission capacity to the grid, particularly in key constrained areas.   For example, a public power entity, the Transmission Agency of Northern California, is a major participant in the project to upgrade California’s infamous Path 15.  Despite these proven benefits of public power, and its role in promoting both infrastructure development and greater competition, H.R. 3406 would create a nearly insurmountable financial barrier to the creation of new publicly owned electric utilities. 

 Following, then, are comments on certain specific provisions of H.R. 3406, based on the foregoing discussion.  As delineated below, APPA has significant concerns about major elements of the bill and some additional concerns regarding several other provisions.   There are also several provisions in the bill that APPA supports and those are discussed below as well.  The positive provisions of the bill, however, do not offset its significant negative impacts.  

Major Concerns  

Section 141 – Repeal of certain provisions of the Federal Power Act regarding disposition of property, consolidation, and purchase of securities 

This section repeals Section 203 of the Federal Power Act, thereby completely eliminating FERC’s authority to review, approve and condition utility mergers and asset disposition.  Accelerating consolidation in the electricity industry already threatens competition and consumers’ interests.  Not only does H.R. 3406 fail to include any provisions to address generation market power, as discussed below, but inclusion of this provision actually makes it more likely that large generation companies will get larger and be able to exercise market power.  Thus, APPA strongly opposes this section and urges its deletion. 

Instead, APPA has consistently urged adoption of a higher standard that would condition merger approval on an affirmative finding that the proposed merger will promote the public interest, as opposed to the current standard that only requires the merger to be consistent with the public interest.  In addition, FERC’s merger authority needs to be clarified and expanded to cover mergers of utility holding companies as well as the disposition of generation assets by jurisdictional utilities and the acquisition of natural gas companies.  FERC lacks the clear authority to review the former.  While APPA believes FERC has the authority and responsibility to review the latter, it has recently declined to do so.  Removal of FERC’s merger authority will lead to an increasing amount of mergers resulting in greater consolidation of market power that will ultimately undermine competition. 

Title I-Subtitle B Provisions Regarding PUHCA 

APPA continues to oppose repeal of the Public Utility Holding Company Act (PUHCA) unless FERC is provided clear authority and support to protect consumers against the abuse of generation market power.  PUHCA has been, and continues to be, an important part of the structure of the electric utility industry by defining the permissible structures of holding company formation and ensuring effective state and federal regulation of these companies in order to protect consumers, investors and the public interest.  PUHCA is also the only federal statute that protects against the abuse of cross-subsidization of affiliated ventures by regulated utility operations.  Cross-subsidization destroys true competition in unregulated markets and overcharges ratepayers.  The repeal of PUHCA should be considered with great caution. 

Unfortunately, H. R. 3406 simply repeals PUHCA without any offsetting provisions to protect consumers against generation market power or cross-subsidization in company affiliate transactions.  At a minimum, Section 113 should be amended to allow federal and state regulators access to a broader range of pertinent information, rather than the proposed limitation of records relating to “costs”.  In addition, APPA suggests that FERC, perhaps in consultation with the Federal Trade Commission and the Department of Justice, should retain the authority to require the restructuring of utility holding companies where its is demonstrated that the holding company operated in a manner inconsistent with the interests of electric consumers.   

Members of the subcommittee may have heard arguments from those in favor of repealing PUHCA asserting that the Act has inhibited investment in new generation.  PUHCA does not, in fact, inhibit investment in either generation or transmission.  Under 1992 amendments to PUHCA, investments in generation plants can be made by any party in any location throughout the United States.  In addition, if regulation under PUHCA is such a detriment to the ability of a private company to grow then why has the number of holding companies regulated by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) increased.  In fact, in the past eight years both the number of registered holding companies and the number of electric customers served by registered holding company subsidiaries has more than doubled. 

Title VII- Investigation and Correction of Anti Competitive Conduct 

APPA is also strongly opposed to this title’s extension of FERC jurisdiction over public power systems.  This encroachment on local authority is neither prudent nor warranted.  Public power systems have been regulated differently under federal law for more than 66 years.  This is neither an accident nor an oversight, but rather good public policy that recognizes that public power systems operate in the public interest and are regulated at the local level.  Local elected officials oversee public power systems across the country to ensure consumers continue to receive low-cost, reliable electricity from their local providers. 

 Except for a few isolated examples, public power systems do not have surplus electricity to sell.  These systems do not represent a significant presence by sellers in the wholesale markets, and public power is, and will continue to be, net purchasers of electricity.  The limited volume of surplus energy from public power systems precludes their ability to set a market-clearing price – public power systems are price makers, not price takers.  There is no policy justification for reversing decades of effective, local authority.   

In addition, Section 702 undermines the compromise reached in portions of Section 201, commonly referred to as “FERC-lite”, for regulation of public power transmission facilities.   Contrary to the intent of FERC-lite, Section 702 allows FERC to retroactively set rates for transmission service.  

Section 202 – Regional Transmission Organizations 

APPA believes that Section 202 is unnecessary and in fact counter-productive.  It should be deleted from the bill.  This section proposes modification of FERC’s RTO authority as set forth in Order 2000.  It would require all transmission owners, including public power systems, to form or participate in an RTO within 12 months, and make certain other changes to characteristics of RTOs as set out in the Order.  APPA agrees that the single most important step that can be taken to achieve the goal of a robust transmission system is the establishment of properly configured, truly independent RTOs that have primary planning responsibility for the regional grids under their control.  APPA continues to support FERC’s existing authority to establish and require public utility participation in strong, truly independent RTOs in order to facilitate the development of vigorously competitive retail markets.   

FERC has maintained in Order 2000 and subsequent orders and proceedings, that it has the authority to order RTO participation by jurisdictional utilities to remedy undue discrimination or facilitate competition.  Congress should do nothing to statutorily interfere with FERC’s development of RTOs or attempt to prescribe specific elements and deadlines.   

Section 202 represents a significant and inappropriate contraction of FERC’s existing authority and creates opportunities that will permit potential RTO participants to delay RTO formation (evidentiary hearings before FERC, FERC decisions to be approved on appeal to the courts only if supported by a “preponderance of the evidence” as opposed to the customary standard of “substantial evidence”).  The section fails to guarantee that RTOs created under this new authority will in fact promote effective competition, and because it is so prescriptive, it will virtually eliminate the opportunity for FERC to make mid-course corrections as experience is gained regarding the creation, operation and appropriate functions of RTOs.  FERC has substantial authority under the Federal Power Act to promote the creation of RTOs and to determine the appropriate size, scope and functions to be performed, including the authority to condition approval of proposed mergers or market based rate sales on membership in a FERC-approved RTO.  Section 202 expressly eliminates this authority. 

FERC must be allowed to proceed so that industry will have the stability that regulatory certainty in this area will provide and regulators will have the flexibility they need to make adaptations as necessary.  In addition, it is not necessary for Congress to expand FERC’s authority to order participation by public power systems, public power will voluntarily join RTOs that are properly configured and provide benefits for public power customers.   

Section 401 – Sustainable Transmission Networks Rulemaking 

Section 401 directs FERC to conduct a rulemaking on incentive and performance-based transmission rates.  APPA is strongly opposed to this section because it is unnecessary and would lead to higher transmission rates.  We therefore urge its’ deletion.  FERC, under the Federal Power Act and Order 888, already has sufficient authority and flexibility to design transmission rates to “promote economically efficient transmission and generation of electricity.”  These rates remain subject to the “just, reasonable, and not unduly discriminatory or preferential” standard that has been the hallmark of FERC ratemaking authority for decades.  (This standard was recently affirmed by FERC in Order 2000 on RTOs).  The language in this section would have the effect of requiring FERC to undermine that standard.  

 Proponents of this language have asserted that incentive pricing is necessary in order to raise the capital needed for investments in new transmission facilities.  They argue that incentives are justified because transmission investment is risky.  This is clearly not the case.  Developing new transmission facilities is clearly a difficult task.  There are substantial obstacles in the siting and permitting process.  Rights of way may be denied for parochial reasons with no consideration given to broader public interest considerations.  Current transmission owners may have incentives to delay grid expansion in order to protect sales of their own generation. These are not problems that can be overcome simply by throwing money at them.  The fact is, transmission construction and operation is not inherently risky.  Transmission is the prototypical low risk, traditional, regulated utility investment that has been very successful in attracting capital at reasonable, regulated rates of return.   A good example of this is the recent Fitch Report on the new American Transmission Company in Wisconsin, a transco that began operations on January 1, 2001.  As the report points out, over 95% of this transmission-only company’s revenue requirement is guaranteed by recovery from its firm, network customers regardless of changes in load, weather, etc.  

The obstacle to new transmission is, in fact, the lack of siting approvals, not the lack of available capital.  Thus, this provision will do nothing to cause the construction of additional transmission facilities or add capacity to existing lines.  Moreover, APPA believes that incentive rates will undoubtedly lead to increases in overall transmission costs, which are decidedly not in the public interest.  

Other Concerns with H.R. 3406  

In addition to the major issues of concern identified above, APPA also has serious concerns with several other provisions in the bill as discussed below.  

Section 201(a)(3) – Certain Wholesale Stranded Costs 

This section would require FERC to impose wholesale stranded costs on cities and towns that municipalize their electric service, using a prescribed formula.  That formula requires the calculation of wholesale stranded cost based on “a reasonable expectation period that is based on the weighted average remaining useful life of generation assets owned or power purchased under contract by the public utility and included in wholesale or retail rates in effect on July 9, 1996.”  The fact that these generation assets may have been sold, or the contracts may have been modified in the intervening years is irrelevant.  Clearly, the only purpose of this language is to render municipalization cost prohibitive and thus deny cities and towns across the nation the fundamental right to determine whether they will offer electricity service themselves, or franchise that service to a private company.  This is the antithesis of the "choice and competition" philosophy the U.S. Congress has espoused as justification for restructuring of the electric utility industry.  Moreover, FERC currently has the authority to fairly decide wholesale stranded cost disputes on a case-by-case basis.  Thus, this provision is unnecessary and APPA strongly urges that it be deleted.   

Section 525Direct Service Industries 

These provisions direct the Bonneville Power Administration (BPA) to negotiate power sales contracts with all willing Northwest aluminum direct service industrial customers beyond the term of the currently effective BPA power supply contracts.  This section would authorize the Department of Energy and not BPA to determine what constitutes a “reasonable level of federal firm power.”  The determination regarding reasonableness is to be based on an allocation of power “that will enable such customers to operate their facilities in the Pacific Northwest in an economic manner for the long term.”  It would appear that the interests of a few aluminum companies are to take precedence over all other consumers in the Pacific Northwest.  It is inappropriate for Congress to legislatively interfere with the renewal of these contracts or to re-establish the situation where, due to wholesale price volatility, these companies could, as they did in the recent past, make more money re-selling their BPA power than by producing aluminum. 

Section 532 – Wholesale Sales by Federal Power Marketing Administrations 

This section states that all rates and charges for the sale of electric energy and capacity by Power Marketing Administrations (PMAs) shall be the lowest possible rates.  Furthermore, the section asserts that charges to consumers will allow the recovery over a reasonable period of years, in accordance with sound business principles, of all costs incurred by the United States for the production of electric energy sold by a PMA, including repayment of the capital investment allocated to power and costs assigned by the Acts of Congress to power for repayment.  

Section 532 is unnecessary and should be deleted.   Existing criteria in federal law, going back to the Reclamation Project Act of 1939 and the Flood Control Act of 1944, for establishing PMA wholesale power rates is sufficient and appropriately balances the requirements to recover federal investments and maintain low electricity rates. 

Section 533 – Regulation of Federal Power Marketing Administration Transmission Systems 

APPA is opposed to this section which would subject PMA transmission rates to full FERC jurisdiction, identical to that applied to “public utilities”.   APPA believes that the current system of regulating these rates, which recognizes the inherent differences between investor-owned utilities and federal entities, is sufficient to recover the federal government’s costs and to protect consumers’ interests. 

Section 534 - Accounting  

Section 534 directs FERC to issue rules to ensure that PMAs utilize the same accounting principles and requirements that are applicable to public utilities, procedures for the filing of complaints with FERC to parties seeking to ensure compliance, and procedures to ensure the power generating agencies and PMAs maintain a consistent set of books and records for purpose of debt repayment.  

This section is also unnecessary and should be deleted.  Federal entities are different than “public utilities” in many ways, including their basic purposes and obligations as prescribed in federal law.  This section would set up conflicts between those legally prescribed obligations that could increase electricity costs for consumers while providing no long-term benefit to the federal government.  

Section 102 – Federal Standards for State Net Metering Programs 

These provisions require states, non-regulated electric utilities, and federal power marketing agencies to implement net metering programs that meet minimum federal standards -- for renewable resources (up to 250 kilowatts).  If a utility fails to implement a program within one year, then FERC establishes a program that the utility must implement.  While there can be positive benefits to net metering, such as its potential to increase the use of renewable resources and provide generation alternatives, net metering is essentially a “retail” program and should be left to states and localities.  Approximately half of the states already have some type of net metering program in the works.  If net metering is to be included in a federal bill it should, at the minimum, grandfather existing state programs.   

Section 103 – Price-responsive Demand Programs 

All utilities have demand reduction, load curtailment, and energy efficiency programs available now to their customers and public power systems in particular have been very responsive to customers in this regard.  APPA believes such programs are best left to state and local entities, and this language is unnecessary.   Moreover, this provision raises a question about whether it is appropriate for the agency that regulates wholesale power markets to be, in effect, a participant in those same markets.   

Provisions of H.R. 3406 that APPA Supports 

While APPA is opposed to the overall bill in its current form, there are several sections of the bill where APPA either supports the language as introduced, or supports the concept embodied in the provision and would seek certain modifications.  These are discussed below: 

Section 201(a)(2) – Open Access Transmission (FERC-Lite)  

While public power systems with transmission facilities are not anxious to be subjected to FERC jurisdiction, the limited jurisdiction contained in this section of H. R 3406, known as FERC-lite, is an acceptable compromise and is consistent with APPA policy.  In essence, FERC-lite would extend FERC jurisdiction to public, cooperative, and federal utilities with transmission facilities interconnected to the national grid.  The FERC-lite language makes the important exception, however, that FERC would not be given the authority to set transmission rates for these non-jurisdictional transmitting utilities.  Instead, FERC would determine whether the rates they charge to others are comparable to those they charge themselves.  If there were discrepancies, FERC would remand the issue to the publicly owned utility.   It is important to note that these provisions do not work unless accompanied by changes in the federal tax code that resolve the barriers posed by the private use limitations on tax-exempt bonds used to finance public power transmission facilities. 

Title III – Transmission Reliability 

APPA supports this title that represents one of the few matters relating to restructuring on which Congress could have the confidence to legislate.  We appreciate the inclusion in H. R. 3406 of additional language suggested by the North American Electric Reliability Council and Chairman Barton’s efforts towards creating a national electric reliability organization to set and enforce reliability standards, subject to FERC oversight.   

Section 402 – Transmission Siting 

APPA also supports, in principle, the bill’s approach to federal siting authority as outlined in section 402.  APPA recognizes that backstop siting authority is a necessary tool to facilitate the siting of new transmission lines that are stymied by the current balkanized, state-by-state siting approval process.  Transmission lines are necessary to support interstate commerce, as well as security interests, and thus a federal role in the siting of these lines is appropriate.  APPA would strongly urge that every reasonable effort be made first at the local and state levels to resolve siting issues and that federal siting authority should only be used as a last resort. 

Section 101 – Interconnection  

APPA generally supports the provisions in the draft given the preservation of appropriate local authority.  We agree with calls for a more streamlined, uniform approach to distributed generation and the use of a standardized technical interconnection, but not at the expense of public health and safety, cost-shifting, and potential reliability problems.  This is one of a number of issues, however, where legislation may not be necessary.   FERC already has jurisdiction under Section 210 of the Federal Power Act (FPA) to order interconnection to any transmission facility.  In addition, the IEEE may soon adopt an industry-wide interconnection standard that adequately preserves local (distribution) control, and FERC may soon adopt some standardized interconnection agreements that resolve most of the issues that have concerned the generator manufacturers and owners.  The successful convergence of these events may obviate the need for Congress to act on this issue.   

 Title V, Subtitle A – Tennessee Valley Authority 

This subtitle represents a previously developed consensus on the relevant issues among the various stakeholders, including in particular TVA’s municipal utility distributors, TVA, and the congressional delegation representing TVA’s service territory.  APPA supports the efforts of its members in this region to modify provisions of existing law to promote overall goals of increased competition, better service and lower rates for customers served by TVA.   

Title VI – Consumer Protections 

Should restructuring legislation move forward, APPA supports the inclusion of the provisions in this title to further protect consumers.  However, other provisions previously addressed, including the elimination of FERC merger review, incentive pricing for transmission, PUHCA repeal, and overly prescriptive provisions regarding RTO formation create significant risks for consumers that are not offset or overcome by these modest consumer protection provisions.   

Conclusion 

  APPA opposes H. R. 3406 in its current form because so much of the bill is either unnecessary or contrary to the interests of consumers and the promotion of effective wholesale competition.  Congress should either defer legislation and allow the FERC to continue to implement its stated objectives, or address a much narrower range of subjects necessary to fill in the gaps in federal oversight.  In any event, it would be wise to heed the lessons learned over the recent past and avoid overly prescriptive changes in federal law.

 
 

Related Documents

 

 
 

Printer Friendly

Comment On This Page

Related Documents

 
 

Document Menu

Hearing Webcast

Invited Witnesses

Member Statements

Printed Hearing Record
(transcript)