 Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations hearing entitled, “A Review of Continuing Security Concerns at DOE’s National Labs”Mr. Chairman, thank you once again for holding another important hearing on the state of security at our Nation’s weapons labs. This will be the fourteenth hearing we have held on this subject over the last eight years. It was the topic of our first oversight hearing for the 110th Congress, and today it may conclude this Subcommittee’s hearings for this Congress. There are many examples of security misadventure and mishap that this Committee has uncovered over those eight years—of classified information disappearing, of drug users obtaining clearances, of sensitive information being uncovered in drug raids, and of promises made and continually broken to improve security. After our last hearing, this Committee asked the Government Accountability Office (GAO) to conduct a comprehensive review of ongoing security issues at Los Alamos National Lab. Today we will hear the results of that work as well as the results of a number of audits and studies by the Department of Energy’s Inspector General and its Office of Independent Oversight. Their conclusions are mixed. While GAO found a number of ongoing concerns at Los Alamos National Laboratory that deserve our attention, they also found evidence of some improvement—enough to make me cautiously optimistic that lab security is in some ways improving. However, this improvement must be tempered by GAO’s warning that security at DOE labs appears cyclical, and it is not clear how Los Alamos intends to ensure these problems will not reoccur. Unfortunately, we will also learn today that while Los Alamos has improved security at another critically important DOE weapons lab—Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory—has not. In April 2008, DOE’s Office of Independent Oversight (OIO) completed an evaluation and review of Livermore’s security posture. The results were shocking and so serious that we can only discuss the specific details in our closed session this afternoon. Let me just say that they identified major problems with key aspects of Livermore’s protective strategy, including malfunctioning equipment, inadequate staffing, and insufficient training of its protective workforce. While we understand that many of these shortcomings are being addressed, the OIO findings are troubling, and we must learn how DOE allowed this to happen and what they are doing to prevent a reoccurrence. Lastly, today we will hear of an even bigger problem facing these labs, and DOE as a whole, and that is the threat from cyber attacks. At our request, GAO conducted a comprehensive review of Los Alamos’ unclassified cyber network, and the results of this review highlight the need for significant security improvements to protect sensitive information on Los Alamos’ unclassified network. As noted by GAO, the information on this network presents “a valuable target for foreign governments, terrorists, and industrial spies.” Unfortunately, this problem is not unique to Los Alamos. All of the DOE labs are facing cyber-security challenges. We will hear testimony that the labs are virtually naked to concerted cyber attacks—especially by assault from persistent, well-funded, and dedicated assailants. Given the sensitivity of these facilities and the people who work there, we need to learn how DOE is going to correct this problem. I would urge this Subcommittee to continue its examination into cyber security in the next Congress and broaden it to include all departments and agencies within our jurisdiction. I expect this may be one of our most important oversight priorities next year and look forward to working with you on this matter. | |
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