SEPTEMBER 6, 2000

I thank Chairman Tauzin and Chairman Upton for holding this hearing. This is exactly the kind of matter that Congress should be looking into. We must gather and understand all the facts so that we can properly assess the behavior of all the parties and whether new legislation and/or improved regulation is needed.

Bridgestone/Firestone’s recall of 14.4 million tires, which it announced on August 9th, is the second largest tire recall ever. It is surpassed only by Firestone’s recall of 14.5 million tires in 1978. The recall in 1978 led to hearings where this Committee disclosed many of the same problems that are involved with the recall today. Then, like now, tread belt separations on Firestone tires were involved in accidents causing serious injury and deaths. Then, like now, many of Firestone’s problems related to its plant in Decatur, Illinois.

The recent recall came about only after Ford Motor Company, whose vehicles were equipped with many of the recalled tires, was given access to Firestone’s claims data in late July and was able to link 46 deaths and a large number of claims to accidents involving three 15-inch models of Firestone tires – the ATX, the ATX II, and the Wilderness AT. Since August 9th, the number of fatalities attributable to those tires has grown to 88, according to the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA). Time is of the essence. I do note that, after my letter of August 11, Firestone agreed to speed up its recall by reimbursing consumers who replaced their tires with those of a competitor.

More is riding on this hearing than the reputations of Firestone and Ford. Countless Americans are on the road today - picking up their kids, driving to work - and the last thing that should worry them is the quality and soundness of their tires. It is unconscionable that many have been placed in that situation. Today, almost one full month after the recall was announced, neither Firestone nor NHTSA, the government agency responsible for tire safety, has been able to identify why these tires are failing and why serious accidents are occurring. Consumers, therefore, have justifiably expressed a great deal of concern for their own safety and that of their loved ones, as well as a lot of frustration about the way this story has unfolded.

Every day there seems to be a new disclosure fostering apprehension that Firestone may not yet have control of the problem. That concern was compounded by the full-page ad Firestone placed in major papers around the country assuring consumers it acted appropriately but acknowledging it does not know what is causing its tires to fail. In order to restore public confidence, Firestone must identify the root cause of its tire failure problem quickly and fully disclose their findings.

Consumers can also take little comfort from Firestone’s explanation of why it took so long for them to identify their tire failure problem. According to Firestone, the problem eluded them because tire manufacturers never analyze property and personal injury claims data to identify defects or problems with tires. They say the universe of claims data is simply too small to analyze. But a staff examination of the records reveals that, since 1995, Firestone had reports on more than 1,600 lawsuits, property claims, and personal injury claims involving the recalled tires. I must say, I find it very curious that Firestone seemingly did not regard 1,600 claims as significant, when it took only 21 claims for State Farm Insurance Company to decide that a potential problem existed.

Records available to the Committee also demonstrate that some at Firestone, in apparent contradiction to its statements to Committee staff and others, analyzed their claims data for 1998. These Firestone analyses show that claims were especially high for the ATX tires and that claims were highest for tires produced at the Decatur, Illinois, plant. And contrary to Firestone’s other assertion, at least one American tire company, Goodyear, says it routinely looks at all of its customer data, including claims data, to identify defect or failure trends with its tires.

Whatever else we learn at this hearing today, I hope we can all agree that tire manufacturers and those for whom tires are made, principally automakers, need to have more open and detailed communication regarding how these critical products perform in the field. If it is industry practice not to share claims data with automakers, then it is time for that industry practice to change. Had the Houston television station not run its story on tire failures causing fatalities, NHTSA may not have examined the data it had already received from State Farm and opened the inquiry that led to its investigation. Without the NHTSA investigation, Ford would not have been able to establish the link between the accidents being reported and the failure of Firestone tires.

And, as for NHTSA, we need to make sure that its resources are adequate so it can effectively perform its important safety work. If budget cuts and other restrictions placed on NHTSA prevent it from protecting the public, then this Committee should seriously look at increasing NHTSA’s budget. It is also entirely appropriate at a time like this to evaluate whether NHTSA’s statutory authority is sufficient, and I trust that we will hear more about this as well.

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, consumers deserve better than this. All parties have a responsibility to make sure that, in another 20 years, this Committee is not confronted by the same problems and failures we see today.