January 24, 2002
Mr. Joseph F. Berardino
Managing Partner and Chief Executive Officer
Andersen LLP
33 W. Monroe Street
Chicago, Illinois 60603
Dear Mr. Berardino:
I am writing with respect to issues raised by an October 16, 2001, e-mail from Nancy A.
Temple, a lawyer in Andersens legal group, to David B. Duncan, the Andersen partner
in charge of the Enron engagement, with ccs to Michael Odom, Richard Corgel, and
Gary B. Goolsby, all Andersen officials, which says in relevant part:
"In light of the non-recurringcharacterization, the lack of any
suggestion that this characterization is not in accordance with GAAP, and the lack of
income statements in accordance with GAAP, I will consult further within the legal group
as to whether we should do anything more to protect ourselves from potential 10A
issues."
The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (Public Law 104-67) added Section
10A to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, at the behest of then Representative Ron Wyden
and with my strong support.
Section 10A requires each audit, required pursuant to the Exchange Act of financial
statements of an issuer by an independent public accountant to include, in accordance with
generally accepted auditing standards,
(1) procedures designed to provide reasonable assurance of detecting illegal acts that
would have a direct and material effect on the determination of financial statement
amounts;
(2) procedures designed to identify related party transactions that are material to the
financial statements or otherwise require disclosure therein; and
(3) an evaluation of whether there is substantial doubt about the ability of the issuer
to continue as a going concern during the ensuring fiscal year.
Section 10A further requires a companys board of directors or its auditor to
notify the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) about possible illegal acts under
certain conditions. Specifically, if, in the course of conducting a covered audit, the
independent public accountant detects or otherwise becomes aware of information indicating
that an illegal act has or may have occurred, the auditor must inform the appropriate
level of management as soon as possible and ensure that the board of directors or the
audit committee is adequately informed. Section 10A also requires that the auditor report
his conclusions directly to the board of directors or audit committee if he concludes the
following:
(1) the likely illegal act has a material effect on the financial statements;
(2) senior management has not taken proper and timely remedial action; and
(3) failure to take remedial action is reasonably expected to result in a departure
from a standard audit report or the auditors resignation.
A board of directors or audit committee that receives such a report shall inform the
SEC within one business day of receiving the report and send the auditor a copy of the
notice provided to the SEC. If the auditor does not receive a copy of the notice within
the required one business day, the auditor is to furnish a copy of the report to the SEC
not later than one business day following the failure to receive a copy of the notice.
Serious concerns are being raised about whether Andersens audits of Enron,
particularly during the restatement periods 1997 through the first two quarters of 2001,
were conducted in compliance with section 10A and with generally accepted auditing
standards concerning the detection of material misstatements due to fraudulent financial
reporting. To assist us in resolving these issues, please provide responses to the
following questions by the close of business on Monday, February 11, 2002:
(1) In 1997, the AICPA issued a new auditing standard, Statement on Auditing Standards
(SAS) No. 82, Consideration of Fraud in a Financial Statement Audit, in order to
improve auditing guidance related to the detection of material misstatements due to
fraudulent financial reporting. The new standard clarified the auditors
responsibility to detect material misstatements resulting from fraudulent financial
reporting, changed the auditors risk assessment process to require documentation of
the auditors assessment of the likelihood of financial statement fraud, and provided
expanded operational guidance to assist auditors in meeting their already existing
responsibility for the detection of material misstatements due to fraud.
For any audits of Enron financial statements conducted in each of the years 1997, 1998,
1999, 2000, and 2001, please describe and document all the steps taken by Andersen in each
instance to comply with SAS No. 82 and any other applicable standards regarding fraudulent
financial reporting.
(2) I have in my possession a copy of an October 19, 2001, e-mail from Mark B. Zajac to
David B. Duncan, with ccs to William E. Swanson and Michael Odom, all Andersen
officials, Subject: FIDO Fraud Test Results -- Enron Corporation. As I understand it, Fido
is a financial statement analysis tool that identifies financial statements that have a
heightened likelihood of material earnings manipulation (financial statements fraud). Fido
identifies particular aspects of the financial statements for investigation by audit
teams. In reporting Enrons results, the Zajac e-mail indicates a "red alert: a
heightened risk of financial statement fraud." In the context of the Enron debacle,
this is tantamount to yelling that the barn door is open long after the horses have fled
the scene and shown up in the next county.
Please advise whether Fido tests were performed in any prior years. If not, explain why
not. If so, please explain the results and provide copies of any documentation, and
advise, also with supporting documentation, whether and how these results were
communicated to the engagement team and to the company and its audit committee.
(3) Please describe and document Andersens compliance with each of the steps
required by section 10A(b) during the period 1997 through 2001.
Thank you for your cooperation and attention to my request. I look forward to reviewing
your response.
Sincerely,
JOHN D. DINGELL
RANKING MEMBER
Enclosures (.pdf
file)
cc: The Honorable W. J. "Billy" Tauzin, Chairman
Committee on Energy and Commerce