February 26, 2002

The Honorable Christine Todd Whitman
Administrator
Environmental Protection Agency
1200 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20460-0001

Dear Administrator Whitman:

We are writing to express our strong concern about the level of vulnerability of our Nation’s public water systems to terrorist attack or other intentional acts and the consequences for the safety and health of communities served by these water systems. President Bush, in his recent State of the Union Address, stated that U.S. forces have in Afghanistan found diagrams of U.S. public water utilities and further stated that we are under "continuing and immediate threats of further attacks." A successful terrorist attack on a public water system would be both devastating and damage public confidence in safe and reliable supplies of public drinking water.

Against the backdrop of this ongoing threat, we wish to inquire about EPA’s plans in this important area. We are aware that approximately 2,000 public water systems in the country have notified the EPA as of November 2001 that they have more than 2,500 lbs. of gaseous chlorine on-site. These systems are located in 46 states and the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico. Gaseous chlorine, if released into the atmosphere, can become a lethal cloud with the potential to injure or kill thousands of nearby residents. For example, a story in the Washington Post on November 20, 2001, indicated that more than 6,000 people in the Washington area would have been killed if terrorists had exploded the chlorine tanks at the Blue Plains Waste Water Treatment Facility.

We are informed that experts from Sandia National Laboratories and the Black & Veitch Company, who train water system operators to conduct vulnerability assessments and have carefully examined the issue, are recommending that water systems substitute safer alternatives for gaseous chlorine. Many utilities are already moving on their own initiative to accomplish this. For example, public water systems in Wyandotte, Michigan, Greensboro, North Carolina, Passaic Valley, New Jersey, and Fairfax County, Virginia, have recently converted to the safer alternative of sodium hypochlorite.

We have great concerns about the ability and record of the EPA as the lead federal agency under Presidential Decision Directive 63 for security in the water utility sector to ensure that appropriate measures are taken at public water systems to correct significant vulnerabilities and minimize the consequences of a terrorist attack. We are particularly troubled by your statement in a speech to the Environmental Foundation of the States on December 7, 2001, as follows:

"As I mentioned, a few moments ago, EPA plays a lead role in helping promote the security of America’s public drinking water and waste water systems. Our role, though, is strictly advisory. We do not have the statutory authority to require any security measures at any water facility."

We strongly support EPA’s efforts to train water system employees to conduct vulnerability assessments. Vulnerability assessments are a necessary tool for drinking water utilities to identify their vulnerabilities. But vulnerability assessments alone do not protect anyone or anything. As vulnerabilities are detected, public water systems must take the necessary corrective actions. Please inform us what steps you are taking to assure the public that the requisite actions are being taken by drinking water utilities to maintain a safe and reliable supply of drinking water and protect the safety of the surrounding community.

To gain a greater understanding of the situation regarding EPA’s actions and authorities relating to drinking water utilities, please respond to the following questions no later than Monday, March 11, 2002:

1. Would the EPA support legislation granting the Agency additional authority to require the adoption of safer technologies or enhanced security measures?

2. Has the EPA advised or made a formal recommendation to public water systems to replace gaseous chlorine with sodium hypochlorite or other safer alternatives such as ozonation or ultraviolet light and if not, why not?

3. Has the Administration sought any new authority so the EPA or any other federal department can ensure that significant vulnerabilities detected at our drinking water utilities are corrected in advance of a terrorist or other intentional malicious act?

4. Specifically, would you support adding language to the emergency powers authority (Section 1431) of the Safe Drinking Water Act that gives the EPA the authority to issue an order to a drinking water utility where the Agency has received information that a significant vulnerability exists that may present an imminent and substantial endangerment to human health or the environment?

5. As vendors approach public water systems with new security devices, is the EPA making any effort to inform water systems of the most effective technologies or devices and proper ways to employ such technologies or devices?

6. Is the EPA aware of any source of information available to public water systems that explain how a drinking water system should be configured or protected to be deemed secure? If not, is the EPA planning to develop a source of such information for different sized water systems?

7. How many public water systems will receive grants in FY 2002 to conduct vulnerability assessments and what do you expect the average amount of each grant will be? Will the EPA, as a condition of receiving a federal grant, require criteria to insure that the vulnerability assessments are comprehensive and of high quality?

Thank you for your cooperation with this request. If you need further information, please contact us or have your staff contact Richard A. Frandsen, Senior Minority Counsel, at (202) 225-3641.

Sincerely,

JOHN D. DINGELL
PETER DEUTSCH
EDOLPHUS TOWNS
MIKE DOYLE
TOM BARRETT
KAREN McCARTHY
GENE GREEN
FRANK PALLONE, JR.
SHERROD BROWN
BILL LUTHER
LOIS CAPPS
JANE HARMAN
HENRY A. WAXMAN