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Washington, D.C. — House Energy and Commerce Committee Chair Cathy McMorris Rodgers (R-WA), Subcommittee on Health Chair Brett Guthrie (R-KY), and Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations Chair Morgan Griffith (R-VA), on behalf of the Health and Oversight Subcommittee Republicans, today wrote letters to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention and U.S. Department of Agriculture. The letters come as part of the Committee’s ongoing investigation into federal laboratory biosafety practices, and the handling of dangerous pathogens in bioresearch.  KEY EXCERPT :  “Committee is investigating the safety and security of federal high-containment laboratories. We are writing to obtain further details about the performance and enforcement of the federal select agent program (FSAP), jointly managed by the CDC/Center for Preparedness and Response/Division of Select Agents and Toxins (DSAT), and the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA)/Animal Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS)/Veterinary Services/Agriculture Select Agent Services.”  BACKGROUND :  At an April 27, 2023, oversight hearing titled “Biosafety and Risky Research: Examining if Science is Outpacing Policy and Safety,” Members and witnesses discussed the FSAP and how to strengthen the oversight of safety in life sciences labs.  According to the seven published FSAP Annual Reports from 2015 – 2021:  The FSAP conducted 1,316 inspections: 173 by the Agriculture Select Agent Services, 857 by the Division of Select Agents and Toxins, and 286 joint inspections by CDC’s DSAT and USDA’s APHIS  The FSAP conducted 46 compliance inspections  17 entities participated in the FSAP Corrective Action Plan program  The FSAP made 20 referrals to the HHS OIG and/or the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service Investigative and Enforcement Services  The Chairs requested documents and answers to questions, including the following, by September 29, 2023:  Please provide copies of all referrals the FSAP has made to the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) Office of Inspector General and/or APHIS Investigative and Enforcement Services since January 1, 2015. Please provide the outcomes of these referrals.  According to the 2020 Annual Report, FSAP received one report involving a complaint about transportation issues that were unrelated to the SAR. FSAP referred this complaint to the Food and Drug Administration and the Department of Transportation. Please provide a copy of this referral. Please provide the outcome of this referral.  Please provide copies of all FSAP compliance inspections conducted at laboratories at FDA, NIH, and CDC since January 1, 2015.  Since January 1, 2015, please list all entities levied civil money penalties as a result of FSAP enforcement actions, the nature of the violations, the kinds of pathogens involved, amount of the penalties, and the total amount of civil money penalties collected. Did any federal government entity have SAR violations that would have subjected a non-federal entity to civil money penalties? If so, which ones, and why were civil money penalties not levied?  For 2015-2021, the FSAP reported conducting 1,316 inspections. How many of those inspections were unannounced inspections?  Since December 22, 2022, has there been a release, loss, or theft of an agent or toxin listed as a federal select agent from or within a laboratory facility owned or operated by the HHS, or any other Federal laboratory facility?     If so, was there a notification to this committee or the Committee on Health, Education, Labor and Pensions of the Senate no later than 72 hours after such event was reported to the HHS Secretary, including (1) the Federal laboratory facility in which such release, loss, or theft occurred; (2) the circumstances of such release, loss, or theft? If not, why not?  Not later than 14 days after such notification to the committees, was an update provided to the committees on (1) any actions taken or planned by the HHS Secretary to mitigate any potential threat such release, loss, or theft may pose to public health and safety; and (2) any actions taken or planned by the HHS Secretary to review the circumstances of such release, loss, or theft, and prevent similar events. CLICK HERE to read the full letter.

Washington, D.C. — House Energy and Commerce Committee Chair Cathy McMorris Rodgers (R-WA), Subcommittee on Health Chair Brett Guthrie (R-KY), and Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations Chair Morgan Griffith (R-VA), on behalf of the Health and Oversight Subcommittee Republicans, today requested the Government Accountability Office (GAO) conduct a study on the National Institutes of Health’s (NIH) effectiveness in overseeing grant funding. BACKGROUND :  NIH is one of the top research and development funding agencies—particularly for biomedical research.    NIH’s program level funding for Fiscal Year 2023 as enacted is $47.678 billion.   In fiscal year 2020, the agency obligated nearly $43 billion for research in areas such as infectious disease prevention, cancer treatment, and mental health.   NIH obligated as much as 80 percent of these funds towards extramural research, performed by outside organizations including universities, medical centers, and other research institutions.   Organizations receiving extramural research awards from NIH may, in turn, award sub-grants for a portion of the work.   As highlighted in HHS OIG and GAO reports , the use of sub-grants may further complicate the management and oversight of NIH research funds.  KEY EXCERPTS :  “A January 2023 report by the Office of Inspector General within the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS OIG) detailed failures by NIH to monitor effectively its grants with EcoHealth Alliance, a nonprofit research organization. According to that report, the organization had overcharged the government for its services and improperly used federal grant funds. Further, a July 2023 report by the Government Accountability Office (GAO) raised similar concerns about NIH’s oversight of grant recipients and recommended that NIH make improvements to its oversight processes.”  […]  “In light of the recent problems in NIH’s oversight and the scale of NIH’s funding of extramural research awards, more transparency is needed about NIH’s policies and procedures as well as its effectiveness in overseeing financial management of its extramural research awards.” The Chairs requested answers to the following questions:  How much funding did NIH provide—using grants, cooperative agreements, or other award mechanisms—for extramural research since fiscal year 2014? For the same time frame, what resources did NIH and each of its institutes and centers have to conduct financial management oversight?  What are the trends in award funding including, for example, the research areas and types/characteristics of award recipients funded; the number, size, and duration of awards; the types of award mechanisms used?  What policies, procedures, and processes does NIH follow to administer and oversee its extramural research awards using grants, cooperative agreements, or other award mechanisms? How do policies, procedures, and processes differ among the NIH institutes and centers in administering and overseeing extramural research awards?   To what extent is NIH, consistent with its policies and procedures, ensuring effective financial management oversight of extramural research funding throughout the award life cycle?  What are the roles and responsibilities of those involved in such oversight including the award recipient?    How, if at all, does NIH’s oversight of extramural research funding differ for intramural research funding?  What internal assessments, if any, does NIH conduct to provide reasonable assurance that funds are being used as intended—including that proposed rates and costs are reasonable and funds are being used appropriately?  How much money has NIH recovered as a result of such internal assessments?    What changes, if any, has NIH implemented based on the findings and lessons learned from such assessments?  What data does NIH collect on the findings and results of its internal assessments? Are there data gaps, and can these gaps be addressed?   What are the lessons learned or best practices from institutes and centers that could be implemented across NIH? CLICK HERE to read the full letter.

Washington, D.C. — House Energy and Committee Chair Cathy McMorris Rodgers (R-WA), Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations Chairman Morgan Griffith (R-VA), and Subcommittee on Health Chairman Brett Guthrie (R-KY), along with Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Pandemic Chairman Brad Wenstrup (R-OH) and Committee on Oversight Accountability Chairman James Comer (R-KY), wrote to the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) in an effort to force officials to comply with previous requests for COVID-19 origins information and cease stonewalling.  In a letter to HHS Secretary Xavier Becerra, the Chairs renewed requests from four previous letters for potentially incriminating documents and communications concerning EcoHealth Alliance, Wuhan Institute of Virology, and the now infamous “Proximal Origin” publication. The Committees have also asked individuals potentially involved with a COVID-19 origins cover-up to appear voluntarily for transcribed interviews—most notably Dr. Francis Collins, Dr. Lawrence Tabak, and Dr. Hugh Auchincloss. If HHS does not meet the stated deadlines, the Chairs will be forced to consider the use of subpoenas to obtain the requested COVID-19 origins information. “This letter consolidates our previous requests regarding the origins of COVID-19 and, as a further accommodation to the Department, tables some requests, adds significant topic specificity, scopes down the time frame of our previous requests, and prioritizes requests most important to the Committees. Considering these significant accommodations, we expect full and timely compliance with each request,”  wrote the Chairs . “If the Department fails to meet any of the prescribed deadlines, the Committees will be forced to consider the use of the compulsory process.” In a second wave of letters, the Chairs reiterated invitations to three individuals with extensive involvement in COVID-19 origins related operations to appear for voluntary transcribed interviews. Notably, the renewed request for the testimony of Dr. Peter Daszak, President of EcoHealth Alliance, is critical to the investigation into the potential use of American taxpayer funds to conduct dangerous gain-of-function research at the Wuhan Institute of Virology.  Further, the Chairs requested voluntary transcribed interviews with Mr. Greg Folkers—who served as Dr. Anthony Fauci’s Chief of Staff—and with Mr. F. Gray Handley—who served as Associate Director for International Affairs at the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases (NIAID) during the COVID-19 pandemic. Should Dr. Daszak, Mr. Folkers, and Mr. Handley continue to refuse to cooperate with the Committees, the use of subpoenas will be considered. Read the letter to HHS Secretary Xavier Becerra here.  Read the voluntary transcribed interview requests for Dr. Peter Daszak, Mr. Greg Folkers, and Mr. Gary Handley below:  Dr. Peter Daszak , EcoHealth Alliance President   Mr. Greg Folkers , Former Chief of Staff at NIAID  Mr. Gary Handley , Former Associate Director for International Affairs at NIAID 

Washington, D.C. — House Energy and Commerce Committee Republicans, led by Chair Cathy McMorris Rodgers, wrote to Ford President and CEO James Farley regarding a new partnership with Chinese-owned Contemporary Amperex Technology Co., Limited (CATL) to build lithium iron phosphate batteries in the United States.  CLICK HERE to read FOX News's coverage: BACKGROUND :  Earlier this year, Ford announced it would invest $3.5 billion to construct a lithium iron phosphate battery plant in Marshall, Michigan.  According to Ford, its wholly-owned subsidiary will manufacture the battery cells using Chinese company CATL’s technology and services.  KEY LETTER EXCERPTS :  “While Ford has labeled this project a ‘commitment to American manufacturing’ and asserts it will create 2,500 new American jobs, we are concerned that Ford’s partnership with a Chinese company could aid China’s efforts to expand its control over United States electric vehicle supply chains and jeopardize national security by furthering dependence on China.”  […]  “Additionally, Members learned at this hearing that Chinese companies often supply their own workers to projects in Latin America and Africa, reinforcing fears that CATL will import workers for this facility rather that creating jobs for United States workers.”  […]  “We seek to learn more about whether this partnership, and others like it, will potentially exacerbate our reliance on China. Should China gain control of domestic electric vehicle production, the United States would be exposed to serious national security risks at a time of escalating geopolitical tensions.”  The Members requested information and answers to the following questions by September 18, 2023:  A copy of the complete licensing agreement between Ford and CATL, including any appendices, amendments, or addenda.  All documents and communications exchanged between Ford officers or employees and officials, appointees, employees, contractors, or consultants of the United States government referring or relating to Ford and CATL’s partnership and eligibility for tax credits and federal incentives.  Did Ford consider making a similar investment in a partnership with a non-Chinese company? If so, why did Ford ultimately decide to partner with CATL? If not, why did Ford not consider other partners?  How many CATL employees will CATL supply to the Facility?  What steps did Ford take to prevent or limit CATL’s ability to halt production unilaterally, such as at the direction of the Chinese government?  CLICK HERE to read the letter. 

Washington, D.C. — House Energy and Commerce Committee Chair Cathy McMorris Rodgers (R-WA), Energy, Climate, and Grid Security Subcommittee Chair Jeff Duncan (R-SC), and Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee Chair Morgan Griffith (R-VA) sent a letter to Hawaiian Electric seeking information regarding the role of electric infrastructure in the August fires that broke out on the island of Maui and in the town of Lahaina. Letters were also sent to the Hawaii Public Utilities Commission and the Hawai’i State Energy Office. KEY EXCERPT: “Our hearts are with the people of Maui as they confront immense grief, sadness, and despair, especially for those who are still searching for their missing loved ones. The pain is unimaginable and the road to recovery is long. We must come to a complete understanding of how this disaster started to ensure Hawaii and other states are prepared to prevent and stop other deadly wildfires.” […] “In our capacity as Chairs of the Committee on Energy and Commerce of the U.S. House of Representatives and its respective energy policy and oversight subcommittees, we are empowered to oversee energy supply, reliability of all power, and regulation of energy resources throughout the country. To that end, we seek a fuller understanding of the role, if any, of the electric infrastructure in this tragic event.” BACKGROUND: On Tuesday, August 8, 2023, a series of deadly fires broke out on the island of Maui and in the town of Lahaina, resulting in the tragic loss of many lives and the destruction of entire communities. The fires are the deadliest in modern U.S. history, with the current death toll at over 100 lives and many hundreds more still missing. Reported evidence of a downed power line sparking dry grass in Lahaina indicates that Hawaiian Electric equipment may have contributed to the fires. Information is also coming to light about actions taken – or not taken – by Hawaiian Electric to harden and modernize the electric grid of Maui in response to the growing risk of wildfires in recent years. Chairs Rodgers, Duncan, and Griffith asked Hawaiian Electric to respond to the following requests for information: What is your understanding of the sequence of events and actions on August 8, 2023, involving the Lahaina fire, including actions taken by Hawaiian Electric? Please describe all actions taken by Hawaiian Electric to address fire risks to the electric grid on Maui prior to August 8, 2023 (going back through 2013). Please describe all actions taken by Hawaiian Electric, Hawaii Public Utilities Commission, Hawai’i State Energy Office and any other applicable entities to mitigate invasive grasses and other vegetation on the island of Maui, in order to prevent or minimize fire risks. Please provide Hawaiian Electric spending on Maui for the past ten years, including, but not limited to, specific spending for utility infrastructure, for energy generation, to meet Hawaii’s renewable energy mandates, and to address identified fire risks. What Hawaiian Electric actions regarding fire risks to the Maui electric grid are pending before the Hawaii Public Utilities Commission? What is the status of those actions? Has the Hawai’i State Energy Office been involved in grid modernization, hardening, and resilience efforts by Hawaiian Electric? If yes, please describe those efforts. In July 2021, the Maui county government assessed and issued a report on the growing threat of fire to the island. Did the report involve any recommendations regarding the electric grid? If yes, what is the status of implementing those recommendations? What orders has the Hawaii Public Utilities Commission issued, or actions taken, since 2018, to address fire risks to the electric grid on Maui? What actions did Hawaiian Electric take after the Maui fires on August 8, 2023, relating to the removal of any equipment, including but not limited to, damaged power lines and poles? Did Hawaiian Electric, Hawaii Public Utilities Commission, and/or the Hawai’i State Energy Office receive any funds from the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act of 2021 or the Inflation Reduction Act of 2022? If so, please provide the amount of money, the program under which the funding was awarded, and the type of funding (grant, loan, etc.). CLICK HERE to read the full letter.

Agency Received Nearly $9 Billion in COVID Supplemental and 9-8-8 Hotline Funds   Washington D.C. — House Energy and Commerce Committee Chair Cathy McMorris Rodgers (R-WA), Health Subcommittee Chair Brett Guthrie (R-KY), and Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee Chair Morgan Griffith (R-VA), on behalf of the Health and Oversight Subcommittee Republicans, sent a letter to the Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration (SAMHSA) requesting a full accounting of how the agency spent more than $8 billion that it was allocated in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. The letter is a continuation of the Committee’s investigation into the COVID supplemental funds received by SAMHSA and awarded to states. Previous responses from SAMHSA did not detail how much of these funds have been spent and how these expenditures were used. KEY EXCERPTS: “Unfortunately, even after prompting by the Committee staff, SAMHSA is not providing the full accounting for billions of dollars in expenditures as requested. SAMHSA needs to be fully forthcoming with information about nearly $8 billion in COVID supplemental funds received by SAMHSA and awarded to states. “In addition, SAMHSA reported more than $900 million has been “invested” in the 9-8-8 crisis care system since FY 2022. This is a massive amount of money, and SAMHSA has not produced specific data showing how these funds are being used, or even if they are being used. “SAMHSA’s description of the December 2022 cybersecurity incident impacting the 9-8-8 Suicide and Crisis Lifeline is also troubling. SAMHSA reported that it is still awaiting the final report from its third-party security assessor.” “Further, SAMHSA suggested that the Committee direct detailed questions to the FBI, given the ongoing nature of the investigation. Given that this incident is being investigated by law enforcement, this indicates a much more significant and concerning event.” CLICK HERE to read the full letter. CLICK HERE to read the Committee’s April 2023 letter to SAMHSA.

Washington D.C. — House Energy and Commerce Committee Chair Cathy McMorris Rodgers (R-WA), Health Subcommittee Chair Brett Guthrie (R-KY), and Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee Chair Morgan Griffith (R-VA), sent two letters to the National Institutes of Health (NIH) following up on the NIH’s lack of response to requests for information and documents. By failing to respond, the NIH is hindering Congress from exercising its Constitutionally mandated oversight responsibilities and not being accountable to the American people. On May 1, 2023 , Chairs Rodgers, Guthrie, and Griffith  sent a letter  to the Acting Director of the NIH, Dr. Lawrence Tabak, regarding NIH’s oversight of potential risky research activities such as virus mutation or manipulation in experiments involving SARS, MERS, or SARS CoV-2. It has been over three months, and the Committee has no meaningful evidence that the NIH is responding to this request. Today’s letter to Dr. Tabak builds on the Committee’s investigation of the adequacy of the NIH’s oversight of research it funds that may pose significant biosafety or biosecurity risks. As written in the letter, “in the event that NIH does not provide documents by that date, the Committee will be forced to consider compulsory process to secure production of the requested documents.” CLICK HERE  to read the full follow-up letter. ADDITIONAL BACKGROUND: In January 2022, the Chairs  requested  a list of all proposed, approved, or ongoing research work that NIH is funding in the area of coronaviruses (especially SARS CoV-2), or viruses related to SARS, MERS, or SARS CoV-2. In its written response, NIH specifically ignored the question: “Does the research involve virus manipulation, passaging of a virus, genetically modified animals, or making any mutations to a virus?” On April 27, 2023, the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations held a  hearing  titled “Biosafety and Risky Research: Examining if Science is Outpacing Policy and Safety.” In June 2023, Committee leaders   sent letters  to the CDC, HHS, and NIH seeking information on laboratory biosafety and biosecurity safety practices at those agencies. The Committee calls on the Biden administration to increase  transparency  both in declassifying information related to the origins of COVID-19 and in the U.S. government’s role in funding risky virus research, including at the Wuhan Institute of Virology.  On May 3, 2023, Chairs Rodgers, Guthrie, and Griffith  sent another letter  to Dr. Tabak requesting information that would bolster the Committee’s ongoing investigation into the origins of COVID-19, specifically regarding any early SARS-CoV-2 sequences, data from early COVID-19 cases, or other pertinent documents related to the early phase of the pandemic. However, as written in today's letter, instead of providing documents that “could help support the Committee’s potential legislative efforts to improve pandemic preparedness, strengthen NIH grant oversight, and enhance the biosafety of laboratory and field research,” the NIH has failed to meaningfully engage. In this follow-up letter, the NIH is once again asked to either comply with this request for information or face a compulsory process.   CLICK HERE to read the full follow-up letter. ADDITIONAL BACKGROUND:  In March of 2023, Congress passed  S. 619 ,  the Covid-19 Origins Act, which requires the Office of the Director of National Intelligence declassify all information relating to potential links between the origins of COVID-19 and the Wuhan Institute of Virology.  In April of 2023, the  New York Times   reported  that the Chinese Communist Party forced a team of scientists from the United States and China to withdraw an early study on COVID-19. In June of 2023, Chair Rodgers  responded  to the Director of National Intelligence’s release of limited information regarding COVID-19 origins by demanding complete declassification of COVID-19 origins information.

Washington, D.C. —  House Energy and Commerce Committee Chair Cathy McMorris Rodgers (R-WA), Health Subcommittee Chair Brett Guthrie (R-KY), and Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee Chair Morgan Griffith (R-VA), on behalf of the Health and Oversight Subcommittee Republicans, sent a letter to Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) Secretary Xavier Becerra. The letter requests the documents signed by HHS Secretary Becerra appointing Dr. Jeanne Marrazzo to a five-year term to serve as Director of the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases (NIAID) at the National Institutes of Health (NIH). Last month, the committee  uncovered  that Secretary Becerra failed to properly appoint 14 Institute and Center (IC) directors at the NIH. The committee is seeking assurances that Dr. Marrazzo has or will be properly appointed in accordance with the Constitution and the 21 st  Century Cures Act. KEY EXCERPTS : “ We write today because we are concerned that you may be continuing on an unconstitutional appointment process  in an effort to avoid accountability for your previous failure to properly reappoint the 14 IC Directors in December 2021. “On August 2, 2023, the NIH issued a press release announcing the appointment of Dr. Jeanne Marrazzo as director of the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases (NIAID) and that she would oversee NIAID’s $6.3 billion budget. The press release stated that Dr. Lawrence Tabak, the Acting Director for the NIH, named her to this position.   The press release included no statement from you or any indication that you had a role in her appointment . HHS has acknowledged the Secretary must appoint NIH IC directors . The May 5, 2023, response letter from Health and Human Services (HHS) Assistant Secretary Melanie Egorin stated the HHS Secretary is the approving official for NIH IC director appointments and the NIH director is the recommending official.  Her letter unequivocally states: “ NIH IC Directors are recommended for appointment by the NIH Director and approved for appointment by the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) .”  Further, you signed affidavits of reappointment with prospective effect of certain NIH IC directors in June 2023.  Your affidavits expressly invoked the Appointments Clause, which tacitly acknowledges that the IC Directors are inferior officers of the United States ." […] “Further, even under HHS’s changed position, Dr. Tabak, as the Acting NIH Director, lacks the authority to make Dr. Marrazzo’s appointment, if in fact he made the appointment.” […] “Since the enactment of the 21st Cures Act in 2016, it is our understanding that the  HHS Secretary in the previous administration personally approved the appointments of NIH IC directors.  This precedent, the clear commands of the U.S. Constitution’s Appointments Clause along with your affidavits of prospective reappointments and HHS correspondence indicate you are required to appoint all NIH IC Directors, including Dr. Jeanne Marrazzo to be the Director of NIAID .” CLICK HERE  to read the full letter. CLICK HERE  to read more about the committee’s investigation and findings. CLICK HERE  to read a transcript of Chair Rodgers’ questioning of Secretary Becerra regarding the appointment of IC Directors at a July 26 th  hearing.

Washington, D.C. — House Energy and Commerce Committee Republicans, led by Chair Cathy McMorris Rodgers (R-WA), Energy, Climate, and Grid Security Subcommittee Chair Jeff Duncan (R-SC), and Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee Chair Morgan Griffith (R-VA), today sent a letter to Department of Energy Secretary Jennifer Granholm demanding answers and transparency following reports that the Secretary consulted with the Chinese Communist Party’s top energy official, Zhang Jianhua, days before the Biden administration announced it would release oil from the Strategic Petroleum Reserve in 2021. KEY LETTER EXCERPTS: " We are troubled by recent reports that you, in your official capacity as Secretary of Energy, had multiple conversations with the Chinese Communist Party’s top energy official just days before the Biden administration announced it would release oil from the Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR) in 2021. This is concerning given the Department of Energy’s (DOE) mismanagement of the SPR, which has left our country more vulnerable to energy supply disruptions and strengthened the leverage of our adversaries to use energy as a geopolitical weapon." [...] "The Biden administration has helped support China’s national security at the expense of our own security by using our strategic energy supplies to help the Chinese build up their own strategic reserves. The House of Representatives, led by the Committee on Energy and Commerce, has worked to protect against this abuse by passing H.R. 22, the Protecting American’s Strategic Petroleum Reserve from China Act to prohibit the Biden administration from selling any products from the reserve to China, and H.R. 21, the Strategic Production Response Act, to ensure the reserve is adequately available during a true emergency. “ Despite these Congressional efforts to hold the Biden administration accountable for undermining our energy security, the DOE apparently is still looking to China as an example and allegedly coordinating with them prior to SPR releases . China poses one of the greatest economic, security, and geopolitical threats to the United States, while continuing to be one the world’s worst polluters. As a result of this administration’s war on American energy and political abuse of the SPR, Americans have become more vulnerable to true energy and national security emergencies while China has profited.”  The members requested information, including the following, by August 21, 2023:  All communications, and any documents referring to or relating to those communications, between yourself and officials, employees, or representatives of the Chinese government, including the National Energy Administration, regarding the Strategic Petroleum Reserve since February 25, 2021, as well as the following information and documents: The name and job title of all officials, employees, or representatives of the Chinese government who participated in the communications. The name and job title of all United States government officials, employees, or contractors who participated in the communications. The date of such communications. The topics of discussion of such communications. Any notes, summaries, memoranda, or readouts produced regarding communications. All briefing materials, notes, or preparatory documents produced to assist in your preparation for such communications. All documents and communications referring or relating to scheduling a call with Director Zhang Jianhua and yourself. All documents and communications referring or relating to your November 19, 2021, and November 21, 2021, calls with Director Zhang Jianhua. Any and all briefing materials, notes, or preparatory documents produced to assist in your preparation for your November 19, 2021, and November 21, 2021, calls with Director Zhang Jianhua. CLICK HERE to read the full letter. CLICK HERE to read Chair Rodgers’ statement on Secretary Granholm’s secret conversations with the top CCP energy official.  ADDITIONAL BACKGROUND: In June 2022, E&C Republican Leaders demanded answers from Secretary Granholm on her management of the SPR and how China is taking advantage of the Biden administration’s use of our strategic fuel reserves. In November 2022, Chair Rodgers and Senate Energy and Natural Resources Committee Republican Leader John Barrasso (R-WY) sent a letter to Secretary Granholm raising concerns about potential damage to the SPR due to President Biden’s unprecedented drawdowns and DOE’s mismanagement of the national security asset. In January 2023, the House passed H.R 22 , the Protecting American’s Strategic Petroleum Reserve from China Act, led by Chair Rodgers, by a bipartisan vote 331-97. The bill protects our energy security by prohibiting the Biden administration from selling any products from the SPR to China, or any entity that intends to export the products to China. In January 2023, the House passed H.R. 21 , the Strategic Production Response Act , which would help ensure the SPR is available during a true energy emergency and not abused for non-emergency, political purposes. In March 2023, Energy and Commerce Republicans called on Secretary Grandholm to testify immediately following her public comments praising China. In May 2023, House and Senate Republican energy leaders requested that the Government Accountability Office (GAO) evaluate DOE’s mismanagement of the SPR, which has increased our reliance on foreign energy sources.